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FOREWORD
Today the quest for energy security stands at or near
the top of most nations’ foreign policy agendas. For
energy-dependent countries lacking sufficient energy
resources of their own, achieving energy security is a
formidable problem. Pakistan, currently the world’s
sixth most heavily populated nation, is one such
country. To ensure its energy future, its government is
active on several fronts, including efforts to more fully
exploit the country’s own energy resources, to negotiate
the construction of transstate natural gas pipelines, and
to build a new coastal seaport at Gwadar, an ambitious
project which its developers hope will enable Pakistan
to occupy an important place in the emerging Asian
energy refining and distribution system.
As Dr. Robert G. Wirsing makes clear in his
monograph, Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of
Energy Resources, Pakistan’s quest for energy security
has run up against a resurgent tribal separatist rebellion
in its sprawling southwestern province of Balochistan—an area which, by virtue of both its own energy
resources and its location, is key to Pakistan’s energy
future. The rebellion pits a government determined
to let nothing stand in the way of its energy agenda
against a Baloch nationalist movement equally determined to have a greater voice in Balochistan’s future. Dr.
Wirsing’s detailed and illuminating monograph makes
a clear case that successful resolution of the Baloch question is essential to Pakistan’s achievement of energy
security.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph examines the Baloch separatist
insurgency that has resurfaced in recent years in
Pakistan’s sprawling Balochistan province. The author
maintains that the context of today’s insurgency differs
in certain important respects from that of its 1970s
predecessor. Most fundamental of these differences are
those stemming from energy resource developments
in what some are calling the “Asian Middle East”
(embracing parts of South, Central, and Southwest
Asia). In particular, the monograph looks at how
Pakistan’s mounting energy insecurity—a product
of rapid increase in demand coupled with rising
scarcity and the region’s intensified energy rivalry—
has magnified the economic and strategic importance
of Balochistan, while at the same time complicating
Pakistan’s efforts to cope with the province’s resurgent
tribal separatism.
This change in the energy context exerts a powerful
threefold impact on the insurgents’ prospects. In the
first place, it lifts Balochistan and Baloch nationalism
to a position much higher on the scale of central
government priorities, thus seeming to warrant, as
the government sees the problem, zero tolerance and
ruthless crushing of the insurgency. Second, it arms
the Baloch insurgents both with greater incentives
than ever for reclaiming control of Balochistan and
with the novel capacity to drive the economic and
political costs to the government of continuing
insurgent activity far higher than ever in the past.
Third (and on a more hopeful note), by promising to
turn Balochistan into an important corridor for energy
trafficking in the region, the changed context creates
major opportunities for addressing Baloch nationalist
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demands in a positive and peaceful manner. While
conceding that the counterinsurgency strategy pursued
by the government thus far has a conspicuously dark
side, the author insists that Balochistan’s rapidly
changing energy context could supply both the means
and the incentives for bringing the insurgency to a
swift, negotiated, and amicable end.
It is recognized that getting the Pakistan government to reverse course in Balochistan—and to engage
the Baloch nationalists politically instead of only
militarily—will no be easy. It is not just that a presumed
force-reliant military “mindset” will get in the way; the
problem of resolving Balochistan’s political fortunes is
much more complicated than that.
Today a formidable array of energy-related and
other strategic forces impinge on that part of the
world. As in the 1970s, Balochistan still falls in the
shadow of strife-torn Afghanistan, which confronts
Islamabad with an endless source of policy dilemmas.
However, innumerable other shadows, equally
problematic and all with their own set of imperatives,
have now been added. The monograph highlights
the manner, in particular, in which Pakistan’s energy
imperatives crowd in upon its policymaking in regard
to the circumstances in Balochistan. These imperatives
include not only its own natural gas resources, but also
the proposed import of natural gas from Iran and/
or Turkmenistan and its all-important collaboration
with China in the laying of groundwork for a northsouth commercial and energy corridor. It seems highly
unlikely that these imperatives will grow any less
pressing as time goes on. As a consequence, persuading
the government to give significantly higher priority
to accommodation of the Baloch tribal minority will
unquestionably be a hard sell.
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BALOCH NATIONALISM
AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY
RESOURCES:
THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF SEPARATISM
IN PAKISTAN
Introduction.
In Afghanistan’s Shadow, a book published in 1981
by well-known author Selig S. Harrison, examined
that era’s threat of Soviet expansionism in the light of
Baloch nationalism. It was in Balochistan,1 the vast and
sparsely populated province in southwestern Pakistan,
that the Pakistan army had ruthlessly suppressed a
tribal separatist insurgency in the course of the 1970s.
Rebellious Balochistan lay between Afghanistan and
the sea. Since Soviet forces had militarily occupied
Afghanistan in late 1979, the possibility had naturally
arisen that Soviet leaders might be tempted to realize the long-cherished Russian goal of securing a warmwater port by exploiting lingering separatist grievances in neighboring Pakistan. “A glance at the map,”
Harrison wrote at the outset of his book, “quickly
explains why strategically located Balochistan and
the five million Baloch tribesmen who live there could
easily become the focal point of superpower conflict.”2
Over a quarter-century has passed since Harrison
made that observation. Baloch nationalism is again on
the rise, and Balochistan is again the scene of violent
encounters between Baloch militants and Pakistani
security forces. Not surprisingly, in comparing
today’s insurgency3 with its 1970s forerunner, we find
numerous continuities. Conspicuous among them
are the government’s persistent refusal to concede

1

any legitimacy to Baloch nationalism or to engage the
Baloch nationalists in serious political negotiations.
These refusals run in company with its parallel
tendency to secure its aims in Balochistan mainly by
military means.
No less evident, however, are the discontinuities
between the earlier and current episodes of Baloch
insurgency. These discontinuities have arisen because
the context of today’s conflict in both its external and
internal domains has in the meantime undergone
some obvious transformation. The Soviet Union is
no more. Shrunken Russia’s historical quest for a
warm-water port now seems barely conceivable and
is rarely discussed. American and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces have taken the
place of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and today the
Afghan enemies of these Western forces, in more than
a few instances, are drawn from the ranks of what
were at one time their staunch anti-Soviet allies. In the
1970s, Pakistan was just recovering from a disastrous
military defeat suffered at the hands of India. It today
manages to sustain a comprehensive dialogue with
India aimed ostensibly at permanent peace and resting
on a surprisingly successful ceasefire in Kashmir that
marked its fourth anniversary near the end of 2007.
The 1970s episode of Baloch insurgency featured
the elected civilian-led government of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto as the militants’ principal antagonist. In the
current round of fighting, the Baloch nationalists are
squared off against the army-dominated government
of President Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in
1999.4 The cast of characters in today’s confrontation
thus has clearly undergone major modification and
role reversal, and the political and strategic motivations
currently driving actions in the region are not simply
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copies of what they were in the earlier period. It is this
change in the context of Baloch separatist nationalism
that is examined in this monograph.
One of the most remarkable changes pertinent
to today’s conflict, and the particular focus of this
monograph, has taken place in its energy context. Put
simply, assured access to hydrocarbon or other energy
resources, including both oil and natural gas, has in
recent decades assumed a far greater importance
than hitherto as a driver of Pakistan’s security policy,
both domestic and external. This is to say that energy
security in Pakistan, as in most other countries in its
neighborhood, now stands at or near the top of national
priorities.5
A sizable hint of energy’s gathering importance
to the conflict in Balochstan was, of course, already
apparent decades ago in the pages of Harrison’s book.
“If it were not for the strategic location of Baluchistan
and the rich potential of oil, uranium, and other resources,”
he observed, “it would be difficult to imagine anyone
fighting over this bleak, desolate, and forbidding
land.”6 But what was then a mere hint has taken on Himalayan proportions, exerting weight both in government and among the separatists that is often decisive.
With the gradual mounting of tensions between
Baloch nationalists and the central government in
the last 5 years have come frequent acts of anti-state
violence, a substantial portion of them directed against
the province’s energy infrastructure and personnel.
Pakistan’s energy resources are thus tangibly implicated
in the insurgency. Considered more closely, they have a
direct and important relationship to Baloch nationalism
in at least three ways. One is that Balochistan itself—
the largest, least populated, and least developed of
Pakistan’s four provinces—is rich in energy resources.
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Among the many grievances expressed by the Baloch
nationalists, the most persistent and long-standing has
been that these resources, including coal as well as gas,
have been exploited by the central government without
adequate compensation to the province.
A second way is that Balochistan is a transit site for
major proposed natural gas pipelines that would carry
gas from either Iran or Turkmenistan to Pakistan and
from there potentially to India. One of many obstacles
to the implementation of these pipeline projects has
been the threat of Baloch militant attacks to disrupt gas
supplies.
A third way in which energy resources have a direct
and important relationship to Baloch nationalism is
that Balochistan is the site of a major port facility and
energy hub currently under development at Gwadar
on the province’s coast (see Map 1). Gwadar is the
terminus of a projected interstate transport corridor
that is to link Pakistan by road, rail, air, and, to some
extent, pipeline with both China’s Xinjiang province
and, via Afghanistan, with the energy-rich Central
Asian Republics (CARs). Baloch nationalists have
complained that the government is developing the port
and corridor without consultation with, involvement
of, or benefit to the Baloch. The anger of Baloch
nationalists has sometimes been directed against
China, whose investment in the Gwadar project and in
other Balochistan-based ventures has been substantial.
A number of Chinese nationals have been the target
of five violent attacks in Pakistan in recent years, with
three of these attacks taking place in Balochistan, two of
which resulted in fatalities.7 Moreover, the additional
fact that the port is being constructed to serve Pakistan’s
huge ambition to become a major energy resource and
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commercial trade intermediary on the Arabian Sea
lends this grievance especial geo-strategic salience.

Map 1. Proposed Natural Gas Pipeline Routes
Transiting Balochistan.
Obviously, the changed energy context exerts a
strong influence on the tactical ebb and flow of the
insurgent-counterinsurgent dynamic. But beyond
this, the argument is made in this monograph that
the changed energy context also exerts a powerful
threefold impact on Baloch nationalism itself. First,
it vastly increases the importance of Balochistan and
Baloch nationalism to the central government. This
increased importance is evident in the compounding
pressures on government to bring the insurgency to
a swift and definitive closure, the reinforcement of
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government’s deep-seated intolerance of insurgent
demands, and the growing temptation to settle the
matter with brute force. Second, the changed energy
context simultaneously arms the Baloch insurgents
with greater incentives than ever for reclaiming control
of Balochistan and, even more important, with the
capacity to drive the economic and political costs of the
government’s counterinsurgency effort far higher than
ever in the past. Third, to both sides’ advantage, the
changed energy context, which includes the potential
for major increases in Pakistan’s revenues and
dramatic improvements in Balochistan’s economy and
social infrastructure, also supplies novel and abundant
opportunities to address Baloch nationalist demands
in a positive and mutually acceptable manner. Thus,
while the insurgency unquestionably has its dark sides,
its rapidly expanding energy context may supply the
means to bring the insurgency to a negotiated and
amicable end.
This monograph begins with a closer look at the
energy-insurgency nexus.
Energy Geopolitics I: Balochstan’s Energy
Resources.
Balochistan has sizable reserves of coal and natural
gas, and there is speculation that it may also hold large
reserves of petroleum. At the moment, however, it is
the province’s natural gas that has special importance
in Pakistan’s energy profile. There are three reasons for
its importance. One is that natural gas, accounting for
about 50 percent of Pakistan’s total energy consumption,
is currently the country’s principal energy source.
Indeed, Pakistan’s economy is one of the world’s most
natural gas dependent. The second is that, of Pakistan’s
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proven natural gas reserves—in 2006 estimated at 28
trillion cubic feet (tcf)—as much as 19 trillion tcf (68
percent) are located in Balochistan. The third is that
Balochistan accounts for from 36 to 45 percent of
Pakistan’s natural gas production, but consumes only
a modest 17 percent of it.8 Of particular note is that
the largest share of the province’s contribution to the
nation’s natural gas production comes from the longoperating Sui gas fields in the Bugti tribal domain,
located among the parts most seriously afflicted by
Baloch militancy.
The militant nationalists’ capability to either block
or disrupt the operations of the natural gas industry
is clearly considerable, constituting a genuine threat,
not a mere nuisance. The state-owned Sui Southern
Gas Company alone, for instance, maintains a 27,542kilometer pipeline distribution network, sprawling
across the two provinces of Sindh and Balochistan, the
size of which obviously defies continuous monitoring
and policing.9 According to reports compiled by writers
for the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation,
militant attacks and incidents of violence in general
have become commonplace since the insurgency
began escalating in 2002, and attacks against natural
gas installations and pipelines in particular are steadily
increasing in number. A January 2006 report stated that
there had been
a total of 843 attacks and incidents of violence . . . reported in different parts of [Balochistan], including 54
attacks on law-enforcement agencies, 31 attacks on gas
pipelines, 417 rocket attacks on various targets, 291 mine
blasts, and 50 abductions. In the same period, a total of
166 incidents of violence were reported in the Kohlu
[Marri tribal headquarters] district, including 45 bomb
blasts and 110 rocket attacks. . . .10
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A report by the same organization in late May 2006
declared that the violence had increased in frequency
and intensity. “The favorite targets of insurgents,” it
explained,
are energy production sites—such as Sui in Dera Bugti—
and energy infrastructure that supplies natural gas to
Pakistan’s industrial hub in Punjab and Karachi. . . . On
May 19, two main gas pipelines to Punjab were blown
up, cutting off gas supplies to the province. . . . Although
it is easy to damage Pakistan’s extended but unguarded
network of gas pipelines, insurgents are now hitting
harder targets such as gas production sites.11

For Baloch nationalists, the over half-century
history of Pakistan’s domestic natural gas industry
is one of unremitting indifference to the province’s
indigenous tribal population. When it came to jobs,
for instance, the gas industry’s well-paid managers
and technicians were almost invariably drawn from
outside Balochistan; local Baloch, inevitably viewed
with some suspicion, were mainly employed in lowend jobs as day laborers.12 An obvious remedy for the
shortage of technically skilled Baloch qualified for
employment in the gas industry—government funding
of technical training institutions in Balochistan—was
never seriously considered until recently.
The nationalists’ strongest dissatisfaction is reserved, however, for what they term Balochistan’s
lopsidedly deficient share of revenues from the government’s sale of natural gas. As it has evolved, the
fiscal arrangement honoring provincial “ownership”
of natural resources is fairly complex. Balochistan
suffers from having been the first province in which
gas was discovered. The royalty on natural gas paid
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by the central government to the provinces is based
on wellhead production costs. These costs, since
Balochistan’s gas fields were discovered and developed
much earlier than those in the Punjab and Sindh, were
long ago stabilized and are today much less than in the
other provinces. The result is that Balochistan receives
proportionately only about one-fifth as much in royalty
payments as the other two gas-producing provinces, a
fiscal circumstance that has the ironic effect of turning
Balochistan, the country’s poorest province but
leading supplier of gas, into an important subsidizer
of the richer provinces.13 The nationalists also maintain
that historically very little of the huge earnings of the
central government in natural gas revenues was ever
returned to the province in the form of development
expenditures.14 In this, as will be discussed later in this
monograph, they are undoubtedly correct.
Pakistan’s annual consumption of natural gas,
currently running at about 1 trillion cubic feet, is
increasing at a fast pace at the same time that proven
reserves are shrinking. This means that, apart from any
increased reliance on imported supplies, pressure on
Pakistan’s natural gas resources coming from industrial, commercial, transport, and residential consumers
is bound to increase. Some of that pressure can be
relieved with more aggressive domestic exploration
and extraction. But that avenue of relief could be
negated by any production lost to militant strikes. The
remedy there will have to come either by thoroughly
crushing the militants or by striking a political bargain
with them. That fact, in turn, guarantees that Pakistan’s
indigenous natural gas supplies, as long as they last,
will remain a focal point of sharp controversy between
Islamabad and Baloch nationalists.
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Energy Geopolitics II: Natural Gas Pipelines.15
Two projects for transporting natural gas via
overland pipelines to markets in Pakistan and India
(see Map 1) are today being actively considered.
One is the proposed 2,700-kilometer-long (nearly
1,700-miles) Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline with a
capacity to transport 2.8 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas
daily from Iran’s huge offshore South Pars field to
terminals in Pakistan and India. Estimated originally
to cost about $4 billion and more recently anywhere
from $7 to $9 billion, it has been under discussion since
the mid-1990s. The other project is the proposed 1,680kilometer-long (about 1,050-miles) TurkmenistanAfghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, with
cost estimates currently running somewhere between
$3.3 billion and $10 billion. This pipeline would have
the eventual capacity to transport up to 3.2 bcf daily
from Turkmenistan’s Dauletabad field to markets in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, having been invited to join
the project in February 2006, India. In neither of the two
projects has the precise overland route of the pipeline
been decided, but both would transit Balochistan.
Energy experts are generally agreed that the
trilateral IPI project, which gained ground in 2004 with
the relaunching of the India-Pakistan peace process,
would bring enormous economic benefit to all three
countries involved—Iran, because the project would
help it bypass the U.S.-imposed and economically
painful Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (renamed
by Congress the Iran Sanctions Act at the time of its
renewal in September 2006); India and Pakistan,
because in both countries energy supplies are falling
increasingly below energy demands.16 Although the
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three parties to the deal have shown positive signs
in the past year or so of a determination to bring the
project to fruition, the obstacles remain formidable and
there are recent signs that the project may be on the
brink of unraveling.
Spiraling costs of construction are one obstacle.
Another is the price India would have to pay for
the gas delivered at its border, which has to reflect
consideration not only of Pakistani demands for a hefty
customs tariff and transit fee but also of the potential
for a more favorable price for gas delivered from
India’s own offshore Krishna Godavari (KG) natural
gas fields in the Bay of Bengal.17 The pricing barrier
seemed to lessen somewhat with the agreement of the
three states in July 2007 on at least part of the pricing
formula.18 But Tehran’s abrupt dismissal on August 12,
2007, of Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh seemed to
have raised this barrier still higher. According to news
media accounts, the action against Hamaneh, a leading
architect of the IPI pipeline’s arduously negotiated trination framework agreement, was taken ostensibly on
grounds that he had offered to sell gas to India and
Pakistan at an unacceptably high 30 percent discount.
Rumored Iranian anger over Pakistan’s alleged
support for American clandestine activity in Iranian
Balochistan was also said to be a possible factor. There
was inevitably speculation that the pipeline project,
which the Iranians had recently been claiming could
begin to supply gas as early as 2011, had exited along
with the Oil Minister.19
These already formidable obstacles have been
given substantial reinforcement by Washington’s
stiff public opposition to the project and its threats to
enforce sanctions against Iran.20 Conveyed repeatedly
and over several years to both Pakistan and India, the
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Bush administration’s distaste for Iranian ambitions in
the region, including its alleged nuclear arms program,
is extremely difficult for either country to ignore.
Pakistan, anointed by Washington in March 2004 as
a “major non-NATO ally,” is the recipient of billions
in American aid for its cooperation in the war against
terrorism. India, in turn, is reluctant to put at risk the
critically important civilian nuclear accord signed by
the United States and India in July 2005. The accord
took a major step towards implementation in July
2007 when the two governments reportedly reached
agreement on the specific terms governing New
Delhi’s access to U.S. nuclear fuel and equipment.21
Nevertheless, the deal has yet to be finally approved by
the currently contumacious U.S. Congress. To ensure
against India’s backsliding on the pipeline matter,
Washington dispatched Energy Secretary Samuel
Bodman to India in March 2007 with the stern message,
publicly delivered, that the IPI pipeline, if allowed to
go forward, would “contribute to the development of
nuclear weapons.” And that, he made clear, had to be
stopped.22
Added to all of these obstacles is the deep distrust
that many Indians harbor when it comes to dealing
with Pakistan on a matter as critical as India’s energy
security. No doubt, this basic distrust is aggravated
by Pakistan’s current domestic instability, including
the potential for an out-of-control Baloch nationalist
insurgency in Pakistan’s sprawling province of
Balochistan. The IPI pipeline, unavoidably vulnerable
to acts of sabotage, would have to transit about 760
kilometers of “sensitive distance” (about 28 percent of
the pipeline’s total length) in this province.23 Electronic
monitoring of the pipeline can reduce the hazard; and
repairs to damaged pipelines typically take from only a
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few hours to a few days.24 According to most observers,
however, gas pipelines of the proposed length are an
easy target and difficult to defend; and attacks on them
can have cumulatively severe economic costs. Baloch
militants, as noted earlier, have taken increasingly in
recent years to attacks on energy infrastructure. That
development, even when the damage inflicted is minor,
is bound to dampen investor confidence in energy
ventures—a hugely important objective of Pakistan’s
economic strategists.25
As for the quadrilateral, America-boosted TAPI
pipeline project, the obstacles are conceivably much
worse. Setting aside the inevitable difficulties that arise
in any four-party negotiation of this sort, the fact is that
two of these parties (Afghanistan, Pakistan) present
a security challenge—an estimated “sensitive transit
distance,” according to one source, of 1,200 kilometers,
or 58 percent of the pipeline’s length—that to most
onlookers looks virtually insuperable.26 Indeed, the
full-blown insurgency that presently engulfs large
parts of southern Afghanistan, on top of the frequent
episodes of militant protest and violence in Pakistan’s
Balochistan, would appear for the time being to
render entirely moot the issue of constructing the
TAPI natural gas pipeline. That Washington has made
clear its preference that New Delhi should scrap the
IPI project and embrace the TAPI alternative does not
necessarily add to its attraction for Indians. They, after
all, might be at least as unwilling to place their country’s
energy security in American hands, which the TAPI
pipeline—transiting U.S.-dominated Afghanistan—
requires, as in Pakistan’s. Admittedly, the Pakistan
government’s surprise announcement on August 20,
2007, that it had awarded a $10 billion contract to
the American-based International Oil Company to
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build an oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to
Pakistan (TAP), extending all the way to Gwadar on
the Balochistan coast, has breathed at least some life
back into this pipeline option, albeit without India’s
explicit inclusion. But the TAP/TAPI project has been
periodically “revived” over the past decade without
material consequence, and the government’s promise
that the newly unveiled venture was scheduled for
completion within 3 years falls noticeably short of
credibility.27
The dim prospects for realization of these gas
pipeline projects, especially in the near term, would
appear certain to have some negative consequences
for Balochistan and Baloch nationalism. For one, any
material gains to development-starved Balochistan
province that might have resulted from its being on the
pipeline’s path would be lost. Such gains include an
opportunity for construction and maintenance jobs, for
instance, or the possibility of a provincial share in gas
transit fees, or wider distribution of natural gas within
the province. Another negative is that the attention paid
by the sensation-seeking news media to the militants’
frequent resort to acts of sabotage against Balochistan’s
existing energy infrastructure seems bound to assist
the government in its effort to fix the militants in the
public mind as pernicious agents of Pakistan’s rapidly
mounting energy crisis, a crisis whose demonstrably
adverse impact on the daily lives of most Pakistanis
grows larger with each passing day.28
Pakistan’s energy shortage is certain to shorten
tempers, in other words, along with reducing ethnic
tolerance. It does not matter that the militants’ tactics
for the most part have thus far inflicted only minor
and quickly repaired damage—far less, one suspects,
than the militants’ capabilities would permit. What
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does count, however, is that these tactics, instead
of winning converts to the Baloch cause, reinforce
the government-promoted stereotype of the Baloch
as reactionary, vengeful, and self-defeating foes of
Pakistan’s economic progress and of modernity itself.
Energy Geopolitics III: Gwadar and the Central Asia
Transport Corridor.
In place of the ill-starred eastward-running natural
gas pipelines, the region is witnessing instead the fastpaced development of competitive and politically
divisive “transport corridors” built on a north-south
axis. These corridors consist mainly of port, road,
rail, and air infrastructural networks. The primary
function of these networks is, along with promotion
of commercial and political ties, to improve Indian
or, as the case may be, Pakistani access to the energyrich CARs and to achieve some influence over the
production, processing, and distribution of energy
resources. The inauguration on March 20, 2007, of
Pakistan’s Chinese-assisted Gwadar deep sea port on
the Balochistan coast gave clear sign of Islamabad’s
intention for Pakistan to become the CARs’ favored
commercial and energy intermediary. The expected
completion by the end of 2008 of the Indian-constructed
Zaranj-Delaram highway in southwestern Afghanistan
will give an equally transparent sign of New Delhi’s
similar intent.
President Musharraf inaugurated the Gwadar
deep sea port in the presence of Chinese Minister for
Communication Li Shen. Musharraf paid tribute in his
address to the friendship between China and Pakistan
that had made the port a reality. He dwelt at some
length on the new seaport’s potential for opening
a major trade corridor to Central Asia, China, and
15

Turkmenistan. Included in the address was a blunt
warning to “extremist elements” in Balochistan who
would be “wiped out of this area” if they failed to
surrender their weapons.29
Musharraf’s comments at Gwadar, brief and
inelegant as they were, commemorated an event of
far more than passing interest to the countries in the
region. An obscure fishing village with a population of
about 5,000 when the project was begun in earnest in
2001, Gwadar has already grown into a bustling town
of at least 125,000—with prospects, if the current boom
in real estate investment is any sign, of far greater
expansion. Its location 650 kilometers (about 400 miles)
west of Karachi provides some needed strategic depth
for Pakistan’s modest-sized naval force, subject in the
past to the blockade of its major base at Karachi by
the much more powerful Indian navy. However, the
obvious military advantages gained by Pakistan from
the new port are only one dimension of Gwadar’s
significance.
Interviewed by the author in March 2007, an official
of Pakistan’s Ministry of Ports and Shipping asserted
with apparent confidence that Gwadar would within
a few years rank among the world’s biggest, best, and
busiest deep sea ports. It had at the time of the inaugural
event three functional berths, with space for at least 14
more. It had enormous advantages, the official claimed,
over its rivals in the region, including Iran’s port of
Chabahar (see Map 1), located in the provinces of
Balochstan and Sistan near the Pakistan border on the
coast of the Gulf of Oman. Like Chabahar, the official
insisted, Gwadar lies on major maritime shipping lanes
close to the region’s vast oil and gas resources, and
also close to the rapidly growing and dynamic Persian
Gulf economies. In contrast to Chabahar, however,
Gwadar, he averred, is an all-year, all-weather, deep
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channel port that will eventually be able to offer
accommodations for the largest oil tankers, along with
ease of access to the docking area and unusually short
turn-around times.30
Pakistani plans for Gwadar envision its evolution
into a major multidimensional hub of economic activity, to be linked in coming years to a rapidly expanded
web of road, rail, air, and pipeline networks to
neighboring states, and potentially satellited by a liquid
natural gas (LNG) terminal, a steel mill, an automobile
assembly plant, a cement plant, and facilities for oil
refining. Plans also call for a first-rate international
airport at Gwadar.
Undoubtedly, it was “the convergence of SinoPakistani strategic interests [that] put the port project
onto a fast track to its early completion”;31 and it is
the Chinese connection with Gwadar, of course, that
has attracted most attention from regional security
observers. As the principal contributor (of about $200
million) to the project’s first phase, China has transparent interests both in monitoring the supply routes
for its rapidly increasing energy shipments from the
Persian Gulf and also in opening an alternative route
via Pakistan for import/export trade serving China’s
vast, sometimes restive, and rapidly developing
Muslim-majority Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
From New Delhi’s point of view, the strategic
implications of the Gwadar project are substantial—
and clearly worrisome. First, Gwadar complicates the
Indian navy’s strategic planning. It is one of several
naval bases mentioned by Musharraf in his inaugural
comments, two of them on the Balochistan coast, which
Pakistan is building to diversify and deepen its naval
defenses. It is one of several signs that Pakistan aspires
to a significantly greater and better-defended naval
presence in the Indian Ocean.
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Second, the construction of Gwadar and its
associated road, rail, and pipeline networks has been
openly justified as a means to materially strengthen
Pakistan’s influence with Afghanistan and the Central
Asian states, with whom it is already formally associated in the Economic Cooperation Organization founded
by Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran in 1985 and expanded to
its present membership of 10 (entirely Muslim states)
in 1992.
Third, New Delhi will inevitably view Gwadar as
another link in the China-built chain encircling India
on its eastern, northern, and western borders. More
perhaps than any other development in the history
of Sino-Pakistan relations, Gwadar extablishes the
major infrastructural framework for substantially
strengthened military and economic ties between
Pakistan and China. Potentially, these ties could lead
to Pakistan’s near absorption into a China-centric
strategic partnership.32
Last, but by no means least important, New Delhi
now has to reckon as well with the strategic significance of Washington’s own increasingly aggressive
engineering activity in the region. On August 26, 2007,
U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez presided
over the dedication of a 673-meter long bridge over
the Pyanj River dividing Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
The bridge, costing over $37 million and able to
handle as many as 1,000 trucks per day, is the largest
U.S. Government-funded infrastructure project in
Tajikistan. Described by the Commerce Secretary as a
“physical and symbolic link between Central Asia and
South Asia,”33 the bridge is a transparent challenge to
Russia’s continued dominance in the Central Asian
region. Indians could not help noticing, however, that
U.S. Embassy press releases at the time called attention
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(not without some irony) to Karachi as a “warm water
port” and to Pakistan as the southern destination of the
bridge’s future traffic.34
New Delhi is, of course, not without its own plans
for developing energy-motivated transport corridors
reaching into CARs. Formally launched in 2000, the
International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)
was a first step in this direction. It joined India initially
with Russia and Iran, and eventually with several
other Asian and European nations, in a project meant
primarily to draw Europe-bound commercial trade
traffic away from the Suez Canal to an alternative and
much shorter road, rail, and sea route leading from the
major Iranian port of Bandar Abbas northwestward
to the Caspian Sea and beyond to the St. Petersburg
gateway and Europe. A branch of INSTC led into
Turkmenistan.
When the Taliban regime was driven from Kabul
in November 2001, the way was cleared for a still more
ambitious Indo-Iranian plan calling for the addition
of a second INSTC route in Iran’s less populated
eastern sector. One of the first items on New Delhi’s
list of aid projects for the new Northern Alliance-based
government in Afghanistan was construction of a 218kilometer (135-mile) Zaranj-Delaram highway link
reaching from the Iranian border in southwestern
Afghanistan to Afghanistan’s existing intercity ring
road (Map 2, left-hand arrow), from there to Feyzabad,
and thence to Tajikistan in Central Asia (Map 2, righthand arrow). The new highway was intended to connect
with Iranian roads (and, eventually, with a new rail line)
leading to Iran’s port of Chabahar (Map 1) currently
under development with Indian assistance. The project
was publicized as providing Afghanistan with a route
to the sea shorter than was currently available through
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Pakistan. The need to bypass Pakistan, which had
consistently stonewalled Indian requests for overland
commercial access to Afghanistan and Central Asia,
partially drove New Delhi’s plan.35 This plan naturally
creates anxiety in Islamabad, which cannot at this point
be certain of the success of its own Gwadar scheme (see
Map 1).

Map 2. Zaranj-Delaram Highway Link from Iran,
across Afghanistan, to Tajikistan.
Baloch nationalism thus finds itself astride two
nearby and rival transport corridors under construction,
with the region’s economic future at stake in their
success or failure. Moreover, the Baloch tribal minority’s
relentlessly-voiced demands for equity, justice, and
self-determination again confront the powerful drivers
of energy security, with intensified urgency and ever
higher stakes. That the Baloch are positioned to be a
major beneficiary of this development—as well as to be
a major actor, negative or positive, on its prospects—
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is abundantly clear. It is just as clear, however, that
Islamabad’s design—as implied in Musharraf’s
inaugural comments at Gwadar—has thus far mainly
been to sweep them aside, apparently reflecting the
view that this option is simpler and presents fewer
risks.
Baloch Nationalism: Aims and Potential.
The Baloch nationalist movement is not a unitary
force. Neither in its leadership nor in its tactics and
goals does it speak with one voice. For some Baloch
nationalists, the horizon of nationalism does not extend
much beyond the boundary of a single tribal identity—
Marri or Bugti, for instance. For others, the horizon
embraces all of the 70-odd Baloch tribes resident
within or near the borders of Balochistan. Some Baloch
nationalists demand complete independence. Most,
hailing the 1973 Constitution as a workable basis for a
reconstructed and strengthened federalism, limit their
aspirations to greater autonomy. Anti-state violence has
been the chosen tactic of some. For the great majority, a
remedy of grievances has been sought mainly through
established state institutions. Notwithstanding these
differences, however, there is virtually no chance that
the problems confronting Islamabad arising from the
current resurgence of Baloch nationalism can be swept
aside.
The actual scale of the present Baloch rebellion is
a matter of considerable controversy, not only with
regard to the number of tribesmen under arms but also
to the number of tribes directly involved, the amount
of damage they have inflicted, and their degree of
success in maintaining control over significant swaths
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of provincial territory. Fueling the controversy is the
fact that much of Balochistan is inaccessible and off
limits to news media representatives and independent
observers. That has made reliable and verified
information about the fighting there extremely hard to
come by. There are huge differences, for instance, in the
estimates given of the number of tribesmen currently
in rebellion. One close observer has claimed that the
Bugti tribe alone has as many as 10,000 tribesmen
under arms.36 A leading English-language newspaper
in Islamabad, The Nation, quoted President Musharraf
as having told a gathering of Pakistan Muslim
League-Quaid-i-Azam(PML-Q) leaders on March 26,
2005, that the Bugti, Marri, and Mengal tribal chiefs
commanded private armies of 7,000, 9,000, and 10,000
men, respectively.37 Spokesmen for the Pakistan army
interviewed by the author in early 2007 ridiculed such
figures, insisting instead that to label the sporadic and
often desultory acts of violence as an insurgency was
itself fundamentally misleading.
A senior police bureaucrat in an off-the-record
interview with the author at the same time put the
figure of full-time fighters for the entire insurgency
at no more than 1,000.38 According to him, the Baloch
militants are “not a structured army or organization.”
The so-called Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and
Balochistan Liberation Force (BLF), he said, are “myths
[existing] only on paper.” In fact, he claimed, only two
tribes, the Marris and the Bugtis, are responsible for
most of the violence; and only one of them, the Marris,
is a major problem. The third of the trio of historically
troublesome tribes, the Mengals, have few tribesmen
under arms, he added, and generally offer little but
moral encouragement to the militants. This means that
the insurgency, in this official’s view, is a serious law-
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and-order problem in only two of the province’s 27
districts, and only a minor vexation elsewhere.
The government’s estimates of the rebels’ manpower have waxed and waned over time depending
on circumstances and the government’s immediate
political desire either to over- or understate the
problem’s magnitude. Minimizing the number of rebels
suits Islamabad’s present understandable objective to
have Balochistan seen by potential foreign investors in
the mega-projects discussed above as a good place to
invest. But such a picture is almost certainly excessively
sanguine. Many well-positioned and knowledgeable
individuals among the author’s interlocutors, while
freely admitting the relative narrowness of the
insurgency’s immediate tribal and territorial base,
insisted that severe alienation from the Pakistan state
was spreading rapidly to the province’s urban areas
and to growing numbers of educated Baloch youths.
That trend, unless reversed, would, of course, give the
nationalist movement an entirely different and much
more threatening coloration. Given the fairly massive
scale achieved by the 1970s insurrection, Islamabad
is in no position to be complacent over the present
rebellion’s currently more limited dimensions.
Baloch nationalism has deep roots in Pakistan. In
fact, alienation from the state has been a constant in
Pakistan’s post-independence history ever since 1948
when the country’s fledgling military, faced with
an independence movement in Kalat in southern
Balochistan, forceably annexed the principality. In the
years since, indigenous alienation has from time to
time led to renewed rebellion, as in the 1970s with the
eruption of a full-scale insurgency so well described
in the pages of Selig Harrison’s book. While no Baloch
rebellion has extended to the entire province or
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succeeded in mobilizing more than a handful of the
Baloch tribes that dwell there, distrust of the Punjabdominated central government and festering discontent
with the political order fostered over the years by that
government are very widely shared among the Baloch.
They constitute a nearly inexhaustible source of fuel
for the nationalist agenda.39
There is, in fact, powerful evidence that Balochistan
has not fared well at all in Pakistan’s political order. For
instance, a recent and methodologically sophisticated
study that disaggregated Pakistan’s gross domestic
product (GDP) into its provincial components for
the years 1972-73 to 1999-2000—a period of 28
years—found that the Punjab alone of the country’s
four provinces had seen its share of national GDP
rise. The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) had
managed merely to maintain its share while Sindh
and Balochistan provinces saw theirs reduced by
about 1 percentage point each—in Balochistan’s case
falling from 4.5 to 3.7 percent. The figures looked even
more dismal, moreover, when broken out in terms of
per capita GDP. In the Punjab, per capita GDP rose
annually in the period surveyed by about 2.4 percent,
in the NWFP by 2.2 percent, in Sindh (even with the
country’s industrial colossus of Karachi included) by
only 1.7 percent, and in Balochistan by a miserable 0.2
percent. “The results,” observed study authors Kaiser
Bengali and Mahpara Sadaqat, “tend to confirm earlier
evidence of an emerging north-south economic divide
in the country.” They also concluded, somewhat
despairingly, that “on the whole, Balochistan
appears—at best—to remain trapped in a low-level
equilibrium and—at worst—regressing further into
under-development.”40
Baloch leaders have been arguing for years
that turning the situation around required, among
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other things, an overhaul of the rules governing
intergovernmental fiscal relations—including both
those pertaining to how the central government shares
the divisible pool of tax revenues with the provinces (the
so-called “vertical” distribution), and those pertaining
to how the provincial share is divided up among the
four provinces (the so-called “horizontal” distribution).
There is apparent agreement among the provinces that
the provincial share in the vertical distribution, now
set at 47.5 percent of revenue collected, should be set at
50 percent.
However, where the Baloch are most adamant
about the need for change, and where there is as yet
no consensus among the provinces, is in the area of
horizontal distribution. As it now stands, revenues are
distributed among the provinces in accord with a strict
per capita population criterion. This formula finds
favor in the Punjab, and to some extent also in Sindh
and the NWFP. It means, of course, that Balochistan,
with just short of 5 percent of the country’s population,
inevitably gets a very small share of the pie. Possessing,
on the other hand, 43.6 percent of the country’s area,
with the unique costs entailed thereby, along with an
exceptionally low level of development, Balochistan,
say its advocates, requires a different distributional
formula.
One such formula, proposed by the renowned
economist Mahbub ul Haq, would adjust the provincial
population weight in accord with a complicated formula
involving a number of factors—the income level of each
province, the disparity of physical infrastructure and
social services, and differences in fiscal discipline and
revenue-generating effort.41 Another approach offers
an Inverse Population Density (IPD) formula, in which
the size of the province is given due weight.42 All such

25

formulas are premised on the reasonable conviction
that population, while obviously the simplest criterion,
is “not always a reasonable approximation of need,”
and that Pakistan should not remain wedded to a
conflict-generating criterion that has long since been
abandoned by other countries, including India.43
Obviously, not all Baloch grievances can be as
readily addressed as by adoption of an alternative
revenue distribution formula. Baloch leaders have
for many years claimed, in particular, that they are
being demographically displaced and marginalized
in their own province, the reasons for which will be
discussed below. While reliable population figures in
regard to Balochistan’s ethno-linguistic composition
are notoriously hard to come by, demographic
circumstances and trends in the province lend this
claim strong support. Pakistan’s fifth and most recent
national census taken in 1998 reported a total national
population of 132.3 million. Of that, Balochi-speakers
accounted for 3.57 percent, or around 4.72 million.
Roughly 3.59 million of these Balochi-speakers
(2.71 percent of the national population) resided in
Balochistan. The population of Balochistan province
itself was given as 6.5 million (4.96 percent of the national population). Baloch (including the Brahui dialect), the language of the province’s titular ethnicity,
was given as the mother tongue of 54.7 percent of
the provincial population; Pashtu, the language of
the second largest group, the Pashtuns, of about 29.6
percent.44
Language data from the 1972 census were
never published; and in the census taken in 1981,
language data were collected on a household rather
than individual basis, frustrating intercensus and
intergroup comparisons. The 1998 figures themselves,
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in any event, are not taken as fully authoritative, even
in official quarters. For instance, in a briefing in 2005
given by the Home Secretary of Balochistan to members
of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan, the
province’s ethnic composition was said to be 45 percent
Baloch and 38 percent Pashtun.45
Two important facts should be kept in mind with
regard to Baloch demography. One is that many
Pakistani Baloch, 23.9 percent of the total if we
extrapolate from the figures above, live outside of
Balochistan, especially in Sindh. The second is that the
Baloch may already be a minority in Balochistan, and,
even if one chooses to accept the official census figures,
they are almost certainly heading in that direction. One
reason for this is that more than a quarter-century of
nearly continuous warfare in neighboring Afghanistan
has resulted in the influx into Balochistan’s northern
districts of hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees,
most of them Pashtuns. Many of them are expected to
remain there, substantially augmenting the province’s
already formidable Pashtun minority. Another reason
is that the development of Gwadar is almost certain
to result eventually in a huge influx—estimates run as
high as 5 million—of non-Baloch into the province’s
southern reaches. Sandwiched as they are between
these two seemingly inexorable immigrations, the
Baloch have good cause for worry.
The fact is that modernization, globalization,
Pakistan’s steadily rising population, and the massive
forces of change unleashed by economic development
are threatening to leave the Baloch far behind. They are
among the poorest, least educated, and least urbanized
of Pakistan’s population; and they are too easily passed
over or pushed aside in the highly competitive social
and economic environments now gaining traction in
Pakistan. This is in part, of course, a structural problem,
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not lending itself readily to policy manipulation. But
these circumstances did not arise unassisted by the
government, whose policies have almost never been
designed to give serious attention to Baloch problems.
One final facet of Balochistan’s contemporary
situation impacting heavily on the aims and potential
of Baloch nationalism is best described as the militarystrategic environment encircling the province. By this,
I mean that the present insurgency is taking place
amid circumstances that, by any reckoning, merit
classification as among the most unstable, violent, and
turbulent on the planet. In neighboring Afghanistan,
there is a bloody war in progress involving the armed
forces of many nations, with no end in sight. The spillover effects into Balochistan—in the form, for instance,
of the province’s harboring of fugitives from the
fighting or its provision of sanctuary or training camps
for forces hostile to the U.S.-led coalition forces46—
have already turned Balochistan into something akin
to a second front in the Afghanistan war. On August
12, 2007, Pakistan’s President Musharraf made the
surprising admission at a major tribal gathering in
Kabul that Afghan militants were indeed getting
support from Pakistani soil.47
Observers often name the provincial capital,
Quetta, as the chief haunt of al-Qaeda and NeoTaliban chieftans. Pakistan routinely accuses India
of using its consulates in both Afghanistan and Iran
for the dispatch of covert agents in aid of the Baloch
rebels.48 Speculation is rife about which “foreign hand”
is currently most busily engaged in Balochistan in the
dirty business of arms supply, espionage, sabotage, and
assassination. In regard to the assassination of Chinese
engineers in Balochistan, in particular, responsibility
has been variously assigned, in addition to the Baloch
militants, to a grand assortment of agents, including
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the “Uighurs from the Uighur diaspora in Pakistan,”49
and the governments of India, Iran, Afghanistan, the
United Arab Emirates, Russia, and even the United
States. One conspiracy-obsessed published narrative,
blithely passing over a host of contradictions, offered
the unlikely thesis that Baloch nationalism’s most
potent international support was coming from a U.S.Russia-India intelligence triad whose diverse motives
somehow converged in Balochistan!50
While the larger part of this speculation about
foreign covert activities in Balochistan must be taken
with more than a pinch of salt, the ample record of
such activities in this part of the globe merits serious
attention. Pakistan has plenty of antagonists in the
region; and the Baloch insurgency, after all, can readily
serve more ends than those of the Baloch themselves.
Pakistan’s Response to Baloch Nationalism.
Reliable information about the fighting in Balochistan has always been scarce; and in Pakistan’s perennially overheated political environment, disinformation
flourishes and propaganda frequently masquerades
as objective fact. Even experienced commentators
may from time to time fall victim to one side or the
other’s deliberately disseminated disinformation.51 It
is essential, therefore, to treat carefully the subject of
Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategy. Nevertheless,
the allegations hurled at the security forces—of
indiscriminate killing of noncombatants, collective
reprisals, coercive disappearances, and arbitrary
arrests, all against a background of wanton disregard
of civil rights and legal protections enshrined in the
country’s generally unheeded constitution—are simply
too numerous and too convincingly documented to be
lightly dismissed.52 To be sure, at times in this conflict
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unfettered brutality appears to have been the rule
of engagement on all sides. The markedly superior
numbers and firepower of the government’s forces
make it virtually certain, however, that the lapses
occur far more often, and with far worse consequences,
at their hands. What, then, can confidently be said of
Pakistan’s so-called “strategy of conflict management”?
In particular, how has it impinged on Pakistan’s
energy planning vis-à-vis tribal nationalist unrest in
Balochistan?53
First of all, the impression is inescapable that
Islamabad, in the words of a 2006 International Crisis
Group (ICG) report, “pins its hopes on a military
solution”;54 it has, in other words, placed its faith
overwhelmingly in the multifaceted and forceful
suppression of the Baloch nationalist movement. This
is consistent with the counterinsurgent strategy the
government employed under the civilian leadership
of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s. In some respects,
however, the current version of counterinsurgency—
in its single-mindedness, inflexibility, and comprehensiveness—far surpasses the admittedly brutal
approach the government took toward the tribal
uprising in the 1970s. In this regard, Selig Harrison’s
recent assessment—that the Musharraf government
“is using new methods, more repressive than those
of his predecessors, to crush the insurgency”55—is
certainly correct. What accounts for this, I believe, are
the added pressures of energy security in the mix of
factors driving the government’s strategy of conflict
management in Balochistan. Nothing else explains as
well Islamabad’s apparent endorsement of what is, in
the last analysis, a virtually “zero-tolerance” model.
This model has three main elements, the first
two of which are mainly carryovers from the 1970s
insurgency:
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1. Information management: psychological warfare, information operations, and public diplomacy.
One important element of the strategy falls under the
heading of what is nowadays commonly designated as
“psychological warfare,” or “information operations,”
or, especially when directed at foreign audiences,
“public diplomacy.” Though extremely difficult to
measure, some of the themes that have been emphasized by the government in programs of this sort have
very likely had the desired impact on target audiences, especially in the West. One such theme, elaborated by spokesmen for the Pakistan army in discussions
with the author in early 2007, was that the “real” problem
in Balochistan was the persistence of the backward and
anachronistic sardari or tumandari system—in which
ordinary Baloch occupied social positions distinctly
inferior to those of the tribal leaders, the sardars or
tumandars. These tribal chiefs and subchiefs, it is
claimed, lord it over ordinary tribesmen, treating them
virtually as bonded labor, demanding total submission
and loyalty, and, to enforce conformity, meting out
severe punishments including incarceration in tribal
prisons or even death.56
From the army’s perspective, the so-called insurgency is little more than the dying gasp of an
obsolete and terribly oppressive system of tribal
authority. It has very little to do, as the army describes
it, with Baloch self-determination or Baloch defense
against government oppression, and much to do instead
with defending an oppressive system of traditional
tribal authority—with perpetuating, in other words,
the power and privilege of traditional tribal elites.
In this telling, the sardars fear that modernity—in
the form of government-sponsored roads, schools,
electricity, health clinics, improved water supply,
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democratic institutions, and so on—will eventually
erode their authority. They fight back by mobilizing
and arming tribal militias against alleged government
“encroachment” on tribal terrain and also against
alleged “expropriation” of natural resources properly
belonging to the indigenous tribes.57
Apart from methodically blaming and disparaging
the tribal leadership, the government’s information
initiative has included belittlement of the insurgency’s
scale. This has been done in terms not only of the
number of fighters in rebellion mentioned earlier, but
also in terms that emphasize the absence of genuine
ideological motivation among the insurgents as well
as the extraordinary narrowness of their tribal base.
Most of what is written about the militancy problem in
Balochistan, an army spokesman heatedly assured me,
is concocted: “It is not an insurgency. . . . The Baloch
militants are employed people [mercenaries]. There is no
[nationalist or other ideological] motivation!”58 Only
three of over 70 tribes, he said, account for the bulk
of the insurgents—the Bugtis, Mengals, and Marris.
Concentrated mainly in only three (Dera Bugti, Kohlu,
and Khuzdar) of the province’s 27 districts, they have
very little support from the rest of the Baloch tribes;
and even these three tribes, he assured me, are highly
fractionalized, with most of the tribesmen, in fact,
favoring the government side.
In sum, the government’s information management
strategy aims at belittlement and disparagement of the
Baloch political leadership. The unfortunate effect is to
depict the objectives of its Baloch adversaries in terms
that discourage and delegitimize political compromise
and accommodation, while at the same time providing
justification for the government’s determination to
employ whatever methods are required, however

32

unsavory, to crush the nationalist movement once and
for all.
2. Political management: political harassment and
intimidation; decapitation of separatist leadership;
divide and rule; and co-option of tribal leadership.
Government and Baloch statements explaining the
reasons for the government’s crackdown on Baloch
nationalist political leadership naturally differ; but
that a determined crackdown has been in progress for
the past 3 years or so is openly acknowledged. Excellent accounts exist of the government’s actions in this
vein,59 and there is no need to repeat all the details
here. In general, these actions consist of mass arrests of
Baloch political activists, numbering, in most accounts,
in the many hundreds or even thousands; exploitation
of the many fissures found within the Baloch ethnicity
itself, both between the major tribal groups and within
them; and the encouragement of divisions and distrust
between the province’s two largest ethno-national
groupings—the Pashtuns and the Baloch. Differing
ethno-linguistically and mobilized into separate political parties, these two groupings inevitably compete
for political space in the province. In their rivalry lies
ample opportunity for government interference and
manipulation.
In early February 2003 when the Baloch insurgency
was still at a relatively low boil, President Musharraf
appointed retired former corps commander Lieutenant General Abdul Qadir Baloch to the crucial provincial post of governor. Reasons given for his dismissal
from that post barely 6 months later in early August
2003 have included alleged corruption and, according
to an official source, “that he hailed from the relatively
small Zehri tribe in Balochistan and [therefore] could
not play his role effectively, keeping in view the domi-
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nant influence of the much stronger sardars of other
major tribes.”60 Another account—unverified—told
to the author in an off-the-record interview in Islamabad in early 2007 by a senior political notable, was
that General Abdul Qadir infuriated Musharraf by attempting on his own initiative to negotiate an end to
tribal disturbances at Dera Bugti with Nawab Akbar
Khan Bugti. Earlier as Quetta corps commander, Qadir
had already had some notable success in this regard.61
Reportedly, only two persons were considered as
Qadir’s replacement—Lieutenant General (retired) Ali
Jan Orakzai, an Orakzai Pashtun,62 and Owais Ahmad
Ghani, a Kakar Pashtun with ancestral ties to Balochstan.63 Owais Ghani got the nod. Ethnic ties and the
possible willingness of a Pashtun leader at that time
to go along with heavier reliance on military force to
settle matters with the Baloch almost certainly would
have figured in Musharraf’s calculations. Interestingly,
General Abdul Qadir, at one time spoken of as a loyal
friend of Musharraf, quickly associated himself, following his removal, with other prominent Pakistanis
in public efforts calling upon Musharraf to either resign as President or as Chief of Army Staff.64
Decapitation efforts also have a long history in the
Balochistan struggle. Arrest, imprisonment, assassination, and involuntary exile of prominent Baloch leaders
were features of Zulfikar Bhutto’s approach to Balochistan as well. Three recent and highly publicized cases
are especially notable in this regard. The first was the
killing on August 26, 2006, of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti at his cave hideout in Marri territory (Kohlu district).
He was the influential leader of the Baloch nationalist Jamhoori Watan Party (Republican National Party).
Culminating a massive siege by army special forces, the
killing of the nearly 80-year old tribal leader along with
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many of his associates removed from the scene a politically cunning and charismatic figure, whose death,
some believe, dealt “a major blow to the insurgency”
and gave Islamabad “a decisive edge over the Baloch
rebel movement.”65 Bugti, having been in earlier years
both Governor and Chief Minister of Balochistan and
having worked hand-in-glove with Zulfikar Bhutto
against the tribal insurgents in the 1970s, hardly fit the
stereotype of a tribal guerrilla fighter. In recent years,
however, he had emerged as one of the most irritating
thorns in Musharraf’s side. Precisely how he perished
is controversial, with some government spokespersons
claiming that he died when the walls of the cave collapsed on him during the fighting, but with the government’s critics insisting that he was the intended victim
of a state-directed assassination.
The second case, following almost immediately in
the wake of Bugti’s death, was that of Sardar Akhtar
Mengal, former Chief Minister of Balochistan and
head of the Balochistan National Party (BNP). Mengal
was the son of Ataullah Mengal, the aging sardar of
the Mengal tribe and one of the tribal icons of the 1970s
rebellion. Mengal was arrested in November 2006 and
tried in the Karachi Anti-Terrorism Court for treason,
a fabricated charge in the view of many observers. He
was subjected, according to the eyewitness report of
a Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) observer, to humiliating confinement in the courtroom
during the trial in a cage-like structure that prevented
any contact with his attorney. Mengal’s example presented a stark warning to other disgruntled Baloch
tribesmen of the price to be paid for resistance to state
authority.66 Mengal was acquitted of the treason charges in early 2007, but he was still in prison in early 2008
on other charges.
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The third notable case of decapitation came in late
November 2007 with the reported slaying by Pakistani
security forces of guerrilla commander Nawabzada
Balach Marri, the youngest of six sons of Nawab Khair
Baksh Marri, another of the most eminent nationalist
leaders of the 1970s insurgency. The younger Marri,
leader of the banned Baloch Liberation Army (BLA),
had apparently fled to Afghanistan in the wake of
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s death in August 2006. Details of Marri’s killing were not announced, but the resulting widespread outbursts of rage among his tribal
kinsmen testified to the gravity of the loss.67
As one of Pakistan’s most senior and highly respected journalists put it,
Anyone challenging the military’s authority in a country
presently being ruled by the chief of army staff General
Musharraf should think many times before daring to do
so. Bugti paid with his life for committing this mistake
[of] picking up the gun to fight the armed forces. Akhtar
Mengal has launched a verbal assault only on the military and his punishment is imprisonment for an uncertain period in tough prison conditions.68

3. Military management: increased deployment
of security forces; new cantonments, military roads,
and other infrastructure; and reliance on military
repression. The greatest divergence in management
strategy between the 1970s insurgency and today’s
insurgency exists in the military realm. Underway
today are plans for bringing responsibility for Balochistan’s security more fully than ever before under
central control, for increasing exponentially the central government’s capacity for surveillance and policing there, and also for increasing dramatically the
presence and reach in the province of the country’s
regular security forces. Foremost of these plans are:
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• Establishment of three new military cantonments in Balochistan to augment the two now
in existence at Sibi and Quetta. One is to be established at Gwadar on the southern coast, another at Kohlu, where the rebellious Marri tribe
is headquartered, and a third at Dera Bugti, site
of both the rebellious Bugti tribal headquarters
as well as of the huge Sui natural gas fields.
• Elimination by 2010 of the separate and indigenously-recruited tribal police forces (levies)
presently responsible for policing the so-called
Category B areas, nonurban portions constituting 95 percent of the provincial territory. These
tribal police forces are to be integrated into the
regular provincial police, which up to now bore
responsibility only for urban provincial territory, the so-called Category A, amounting to 5
percent.69
The government’s preoccupation nowadays with
Pakistan’s energy security assuredly looms large
in these military management strategies—aimed
obviously at increasing the central government’s
policing and surveillance capabilities. In the absence of
their determined implementation, as the government
understands the issue, none of the three crucial energyrelated initiatives discussed earlier in this monograph—
i.e., exploiting Balochistan’s own as yet only partially
tapped energy resources, laying natural gas pipelines
transiting the province, and constructing the vast
infrastructure for a transport corridor to Central Asia
and Xinjiang—can be successfully accomplished. Much
is at stake—Pakistan’s economic progress, the security
of its borders in a hostile neighborhood, and the future
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of its vital alliance relationships with China and the
United States. Better, it is believed by the military
leadership in Islamabad, to depend on coercive state
power—the immediately at-hand and reliable security
forces—than accede to the demands of a small,
politically weak, recalcitrant, and untrustworthy
ethno-tribal minority whose interests inevitably run
significantly counter to those of the state.
It is not that accommodating the Baloch minority
has not been thought about in the highest circles of
government and military. On September 29, 2004, then
Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujat Hussain announced
the formation of a Parliamentary Committee on
Balochstan, constituted to examine the situation in the
province and to make recommendations to ameliorate
conditions and promote inter-provincial harmony.
The Committee produced an admirably detailed
and comprehensive report at the end of 2005. Its
recommendations, filling seven pages and numbering
in the dozens, called for numerous programs and
reforms including an increase in the provincial share
of natural gas revenues, stricter implementation of
the job quota for Balochistan-domiciled persons in the
federal services, larger provincial representation on the
Gwadar Port Authority, construction of new dams and
reservoirs to counter drought conditions in the province, and the discontinuance of humiliating treatment
of provincial citizens at hundreds of security checkpoints maintained by the federal government’s Coast
Guard and Frontier Corps personnel throughout the
province.70
However, when it came to the exceedingly
sensitive matter of new cantonments, the Committee
took refuge in discreetly phrased language, urging
delay in construction pending “resolution of major
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current issues of Balochistan, . . . so that the congenial
atmosphere currently created may be sustained.”71
It was clear: the Committee members believed that
construction of the new cantonments could not, and
perhaps should not, be stopped.
Although the military-led government appeared
willing, at least up until recent years, to give
consideration to political options suggested by some
members of the country’s civilian political elite,
genuine accommodation of the Baloch minority does
not seem to have commanded the military’s sincere
and sustained interest. This fact was driven home
forcefully to the author by comments made in a lengthy
interview in January 2007 with a senior bureaucrat
with years of top-level experience in Balochistan. He
professed some sympathy with the viewpoint of the
Baloch sardars. They routinely pointed out to him, he
said, that government decisions in regard to planned
mega-development projects in Balochistan, projects
like the Gwadar deep sea port and the Kacchhi Canal
irrigation project that would have a huge impact on the
lives of Baloch, were taken without any participation at
all by the Baloch. This, he said, was true. The projects
were the product of a “military mindset,” a “tunnel
view” that precluded “carrying the people along”
with government planning. This view, he added, was
especially prominent among military intelligence
officers. “If the Baloch sardars had been taken into
confidence,” he emphasized, “the militancy problem
would have been diminished. . . . Everything is possible
if political dialogue is opened up, . . . even if the sardars are
unreasonable.”72
My interlocutor’s willingness to parcel out the
blame for the Baloch insurgency more widely than was
customary for Pakistani government officials seemed
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to me a promising departure from the egregiously
one-sided vilification campaigns characteristic of the
“information operations” discussed above. Even more
promising was his extraordinary confidence in the
healing power of political dialogue. He did not strike
me as naïve. On the contrary, he had dwelt at length
during the interview on the subject of foreign support
of the insurgents, arguing earnestly that a tiny handful
of sardars could not possibly take on the government
of Pakistan unless given material support from the
outside. But even in the face of foreign interference, he
averred, “all things are doable.”
In this official’s view, then, the government’s methodical demonization of the offending sardars, even
in cases where some amount of rebuke might have
been warranted, has been counterproductive. The
more they were hounded, harassed, and humiliated,
the more certain the Baloch became that the government’s real aim is to marginalize them and to
reduce them to second class citizenship in their own
province.
Observe that this official’s endorsement of a
distinctly political approach to the Baloch problem is not
to be confused or conflated with the contention in some
quarters (the recent ICG report, for instance) that “the
conflict could be resolved easily,” provided free and fair
elections [were] held in Pakistan by the end of 2007.73
That sort of sanguine claim relies much too heavily
on hoped-for outcomes of “democratic transition”—
in other words, changes in political attitudes and
behavior expected from competitive elections, civilianrun legislative bodies, and accountability to voters—to
bring the threatening tribal insurgency to a close. In
this connection, it is well to keep in mind that the 1970s
insurgency erupted in the midst of one of Pakistan’s
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infrequent periods of civilian rule, with the country’s
leader—Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—displaying as little
inclination to accommodate the Baloch leadership’s
quest for greater autonomy as today’s military
leadership. Pakistani democratization is not a magic
carpet that will carry the country inexorably in the
direction of better government.
The powerful geopolitical and geo-strategic forces
we have been considering here—energy rivalry
foremost among them—that today inhabit a regional
environment involving India, China, Russia, Central
Asia, Iran, and the United States, along with a host of
substate entities like Balochistan, seem unlikely to yield
a solution so easily. No doubt democratic elections are
one essential component of a solution. But something
more than an election—more than the mere substitution
of civilian in place of military rule—is needed to right
the obviously wrong circumstances facing Balochistan.
That something more is meaningful recognition that
Pakistan’s energy security can be fully safeguarded
only when Baloch nationalism has been accommodated
in good faith. The Baloch need to become partners of
energy development, not its enemies. Any other course
is fraught with danger.
Conclusion.
To conclude, the context of today’s Baloch separatist-motivated insurgency differs in important respects
from that of its 1970s predecessor, most fundamentally
in terms of energy resource developments in what some
are calling the “Asian Middle East” (embracing parts
of South, Central, and Southwest Asia). This change
in the energy context exerts a powerful threefold
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impact on the insurgents’ prospects—first, by lifting
Balochistan and Baloch nationalism to a point much
higher on the scale of central government priorities,
warranting, as the government sees the problem, zero
tolerance and a crushing response; second, by arming
the Baloch insurgents both with greater incentives
for reclaiming control of Balochistan and with the
capacity to drive up the economic and political costs
to the government of continuing insurgent activity;
and third (on a more hopeful note), by creating major
opportunities—specifically, by turning Balochistan
into an important energy conduit in the region—to
address Baloch nationalist demands in a positive and
mutually acceptable manner. Despite the ruthlessness
of the counterinsurgency strategy pursued by the
government thus far, Balochistan’s rapidly intensifying
energy context could supply both the means and
the incentives for bringing the insurgency to a swift,
negotiated, and amicable end.
Persuading the Pakistan government to reverse
course in Balochistan and engage the Baloch nationalists politically and with a far more measured and
judicious resort to the military option, will not be easy.
The problem is not the alleged military “mindset.”
The problem is rather more complicated. The energyrelated and other strategic forces impacting on that
part of the world join together in shaping Pakistani
perceptions of their policy requirements, in some
instances narrowing options, in others practically
dictating Islamabad’s actions. Unfortunately, as Justin
Dunne has perceptively observed, these forces “have
demanded that the central government more strongly
exert its authority in Baluchistan.”74
As in the 1970s, Balochistan still stands in the shadow of Afghanistan, a source of endless policy dilemmas
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for Islamabad; but innumerable other shadows,
equally darkening and each with its own set of imperatives, have emerged. Pakistan’s energy imperatives
relate not only to its own natural gas resources but also
to the proposed importation of natural gas from Iran
and/or Turkmenistan, as well as to its all-important
collaboration with China in groundworking a northsouth commercial and energy corridor. All these factors
crowd in upon Pakistan’s policymaking in regard to
the circumstances in Balochistan. Particularly, every
effort must be made to ensure that no more Chinese
engineers are slain anywhere in Balochistan.75 It seems
highly unlikely that these imperatives will grow any
less pressing as time goes on. Giving significantly
higher priority to the accommodation of the Baloch
tribal minority, in the face of these imperatives, will be
a hard sell.
However, Islamabad must come to realize that accommodating the Baloch nationalists makes far better
sense than either neglecting or exterminating them.
After all, energy rivalry is not the only factor affecting
the context of the Baloch insurgency. Contemporary
insurgency more generally, as Steven Metz persuasively argues, is undergoing fundamental change in its
strategic context, structure, and dynamics, so that it
bears less and less resemblance to its forebears. This
metamorphosis, he says, mandates that governments
adopt “a very different way of thinking about (and
undertaking) counterinsurgency.” The real threat posed
by insurgency, he observes, is the deleterious effects of
sustained conflict. Political destabilization and a host of
other damaging pathologies may be the consequence of
attempts to destroy insurgents. “Protracted conflict,”
he declares, “not insurgent victory, is the threat.”76
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Thus Pakistan’s leaders, along with the leaders of
states supporting Pakistan, should undertake on an
urgent basis a reexamination of their policies so as to
avoid if possible protracted conflict in Balochistan.
The best overall way to do this is to make the Baloch
partners to energy development, not antagonists of it.
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